We compare here the relative strength of four widely used procedures on finite strategic games: iterated elimination of weakly/strictly dominated strategies by a pure/mixed strategy. A complication is that none of these procedures is based on a monotonic operator. To deal with this problem we use 'global' versions of these operators.
Introduction
In the literature four procedures of reducing finite strategic games have been widely studied: iterated elimination of weakly/strictly dominated strategies by a pure/mixed strategy. Denote the corresponding operators (the mnemonics should be clear, 'L' refers to 'local' the meaning of which will be clarified later) respectively by LW, MLW, LS and MLS. When these operators are applied to a specific game G we get the following obvious inclusions:
MLW(G) ⊆ LW(G) ⊆ LS(G) and MLW(G) ⊆ MLS(G) ⊆ LS(G).
It is then natural to expect that these inclusions carry on to the outcomes of the iterations of these operators. It turns out that this is not completely true. Moreover, proofs of some of the apparently obvious implications are not, in our view, completely straightforward. One of the complications is that none of these operators is monotonic. To reason about them we use their 'global' versions.
More precisely, given two strategy elimination operators Φ l and Ψ l such that for all games G, Φ l (G) ⊆ Ψ l (G) we prove the inclusion Φ 
, (iv) show that at least one of Φ g and Ψ g is monotonic.
The last two steps then imply Φ 
Preliminaries

Strategic games
By a strategic game (in short, a game) for n players (n > 1) we mean a sequence
where for each i ∈ [1..n]
• S i is the non-empty, finite set of strategies available to player i,
• p i is the payoff function for the player i, so
where R is the set of real numbers.
Given a sequence of sets of strategies S 1 , . . ., S n and s ∈ S 1 × . . . × S n we denote the ith element of s by s i , denote (s 1 , . . ., s i−1 , s i+1 , . . ., s n ) by s −i and similarly with S −i , and write (s
where we assume that s ′ i ∈ S i . We denote the strategies of player i by s i , possibly with some superscripts.
Given a finite non-empty set A we denote by ∆A the set of probability distributions over A and call any element of ∆S i a mixed strategy of player i. The payoff functions are extended in the standard way to mixed strategies.
We say that G := (S 1 , . . ., S n ) is a restriction of a game H := (T 1 , . . ., T n , p 1 , . . ., p n ) if each S i is a (possibly empty) subset of T i . We identify the restriction (T 1 , . . ., T n ) with H. A subgame of H is a restriction (S 1 , . . ., S n ) with all S i non-empty.
To analyze various ways of iterated elimination of strategies from an initial game H we view such procedures as operators on the set of subgames of H. A minor complication is that this set together with the componentwise inclusion on the players' strategy sets does not form a lattice. Consequently, we extend these operators to the set of all restrictions of H, which together with the componentwise set inclusion does form a lattice.
Given a restriction G := (S 1 , . . ., S n ) of H = (T 1 , . . ., T n , p 1 , . . ., p n ) and two strategies s i ∈ T i and m i ∈ ∆T i we write m i ≻ G s i as an abbreviation for
In the first case we say that s i is strictly dominated on G by m i and in the second one that s i is weakly dominated on G by m i . In particular m i can be a pure strategy, i.e. an element of T i .
Given an operator T on a finite lattice (D, ⊆ ) we denote by T k the k-fold iteration of T , where T 0 = D (so the iterations start 'at the top') and let
When comparing two ways of eliminating strategies from a strategic game, represented by the operators T and U on the lattice of all restrictions of H, we would like to deduce T ω ⊆ U ω from the fact that for all G, T (G) ⊆ U(G). Unfortunately, in general this implication does not hold; a revealing example is provided in Section 4. What does hold is the following simple lemma that relates to steps (iii) and (iv) of the generic procedure from the Introduction and reveals the importance of the monotonicity.
Lemma 1 Consider two operators T and U on a finite lattice (D, ⊆ ), such that
• at least one of T and U is monotonic.
Proof. We prove by induction that for all k ≥ 0 we have T k ⊆ U k . The claim holds for k = 0. Suppose it holds for some k. Then by the assumptions and the induction hypothesis we have the following string of inclusions and equalities:
• if U is monotonic:
Strict dominance
From now we fix an initial game H = (T 1 , . . ., T n , p 1 , . . ., p n ). Given a restriction G := (S 1 , . . ., S n ) of H we denote S i by G i . In particular we denote T i by H i . First we focus on two operators on the restrictions of H:
where for all i ∈ [1..n]
and MLS defined analogously but with G
Starting with Luce and Raiffa [1957] , the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies is customarily defined as the outcome of the iteration of the MLS operator starting with the initial game H.
To reason about the above two operators we introduce two related operators defined by ('G' stands for 'global'):
and MGS defined analogously but with G
So in the LS and MLS operators we limit our attention to strict dominance by a pure/mixed strategy in the current game, G, while in the other two operators we consider strict dominance by a pure/mixed strategy in the initial game, H.
The difference is crucial because the operators LS and MLS are not monotonic, while GS and MGS are. To see the former just take the following game H:
Note that LS(H) = MLS(H) = ({A}, {X}) and LS({B}, {X}) = MLS({B}, {X}) = ({B}, {X}). So ({B}, {X}) ⊆ H, while neither LS({B}, {X}) ⊆ LS(H) nor MLS({B}, {X}) ⊆ MLS(H).
Monotonicity of GS and MGS follows directly from their definitions. The MGS operator is studied in Brandenburger, Friedenberg and Keisler [2006b] (it is their operator Φ) and in Apt [2007b] . For the case of strict dominance by a pure strategy it was introduced for arbitrary games in Milgrom and Roberts [1990 , pages 1264 -1265 , studied for compact games with continuous payoffs in Ritzberger [2001, Section 5 .1] and considered for arbitrary games in the presence of transfinite iterations in Chen, Long and Luo [2005] and Apt [2007b] .
The fact that the MGS operator is monotonic has some mathematical advantages. For example, by virtue of a general result established in Apt [2007b] , it is automatically order independent. Moreover, thanks to monotonicity, as argued in Apt [2007a] , it can be used in the epistemic framework of game theory based on possibility correspondences as 'a stand alone' concept of rationality.
The following result, the second part of which was proved (as Proposition 2.2 (ii)) in Brandenburger, Friedenberg and Keisler [2006b] , relates the original operators to their global versions and corresponds to step (ii) of the generic procedure from the Introduction.
Proof. See the appendix. 2
This allows us to establish the expected inclusion.
Proof. This is a consequence of the mentioned generic procedure, since step (iii) holds: for all restrictions G, MGS(G) ⊆ GS(G), and step (iv) holds: both MGS and GS are monotonic. 2
Weak dominance
Next we compare the LS and MLS operators with their weak dominance counterparts, LW and MLW, defined in the same way, but using the ≻ w G relation instead of ≻ G . In the literature, starting with Luce and Raiffa [1957] , the iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies is customarily defined as the outcome of the iteration of the MLW operator starting with the initial game H.
To reason about these two operators we use the corresponding 'global' versions, GW and MGW, defined in the same way as for strict dominance. We have following counterpart of Lemma 2, the second part of which was proved (as Lemma F.1) in Brandenburger, Friedenberg and Keisler [2006a] .
This allows us to establish the following result.
Theorem 2 LW ω ⊆ LS ω and MLW ω ⊆ MLS ω .
Proof. Again, this is a consequence of the generic procedure from the Introduction. Indeed, step (iii) holds: for all restrictions G, GW(G) ⊆ GS(G) and MGW(G) ⊆ MGS(G), and step (iv) holds: both GS and MGS are monotonic. 2
However, surprisingly, the inclusion MLW ω ⊆ LW ω does not hold. Another application of MLW yields no change. In contrast, after three iterations of the LW operator to the initial game we reach X A 2, 1 2 Since the conclusion of Lemma 1 does not apply here, while Lemma 3 holds, we conclude that none of the operators LW, MLW, GW and MGW is monotonic.
